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Masking neo-liberal development:
Polanyi, rule of law and
dis-embedding dynamics
Mark Findlay
Singapore Management University School of Law, Singapore, Singapore
Abstract
Purpose – Polanyi in his analysis of market dis-embedding suggests a drift in economic relations from the social
to the ﬁctitious. The purpose of this paper is to add two crucial components to the dis-embedding dynamic: rule of
law discourse as a market force away from the social, and through suspension of imagination and of disbelief, the
incongruous compatibility of actual andﬁctional markets that further works against embedding.
Design/methodology/approach – Theory building through the application and testing of the Polanyian
market dis-embedding analysis is a central concern for the paper. Through the example of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and themanner in which the rule of law discoursemasks neo-liberal development inequities, the
paper offers an understanding of the forces behindmarket dis-embedding North to SouthWorlds and themanner
in which through the collusion of legal orientalist, the true impact of the development inequities are concealed.
Findings – The empirical value of the theorising is to allow for studies on the impact of FDI on fragmented
South World market economies using Polanyian dis-embedding reﬁned by the suspension of critique which
the rule of law discourse enables.
Originality/value – The masking functions of the rule of law discourse in global trade contexts, the paper
argues, conceal stark market power asymmetries hardwired into South World development policy through
post-colonial free-trade regimes. The legal certainty and commercial predictability that the institutions and
processes of dispersed law are said to ensure, have an established market relationship with global trade.
However, while resting on ideologies of liberty and equality, the rule of law discourse hides their market
suspension in favour of stabilising and auctioning universally inequitable market conditions for the purposes
of the neo-liberal global trade agenda.
Keywords Rule of law, Dis-embedding, Neoliberal global economic model,
Post-colonial legal orientalist, Suspension
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
The rule of law discourse facilitates neo-liberal global free trade agendas[1]. These
agendas, however, are having signiﬁcantly negative impacts on fragile domestic South
World markets despite the loud chorus in global development policy extolling the
economic advantages of foreign direct investment (FDI)[2]. The paradox developed
through the analysis to follow is, how can economic discrimination eventuate if the rule
of law is required as an essential pre-condition for global trade policy? Does the rule of
law not advance social equality? (Gowder, 2016). Can the rule of law discourse co-exist
with trading imperatives which advantage the rich at the cost of the powerless?
Even after recognising the ubiquity of a universalised governance concept such as the
rule of law, it remains materially required as a condition of global economic development
(Haggard and Tiede, 2011; Berg and Desai, 2013). From the earliest days of capitalist
exchange economies, legality and economy have combined to ensure the value of
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commodiﬁed property, which is the currency of exchange-based trade[3]. Tamanaha says,
concerning synergies between the emergence of the rule of law discourse and the birth of the
bourgeois, that the latter saw in the former a concomitant recognition of their mutual
interests in politics and law. This dependency of capitalist economic advantage on the rule
of law legitimacy, notes Tamanaha, lies at the heart of liberalism as a preferred governance
mode in that the normative principles which are the rule of law (in more than its limited
literalist interpretations) make exchange markets look fair, even when their crucial features
such as the differential value of labour, are anything but (Tamanaha, 2004).
Tamanaha proceeds to establish the essential bond between liberalism and capitalism,
quoting Schapiro that liberalism expresses a view of politics (individualist and valued on
wealth creation) required by and legitimating contemporary market economy practices
(Tamanaha, 2004, p. 83). Therefore, it could be assumed that the rule of law discourse assists
in the achievement of capitalist economic advancement worldwide, wherein now free-trade
is pivotal. Then, why are fragile domestic South World markets not blossoming from the
beneﬁts of this heralded advantage?
Montesquieu’s observation on market morality suggests that commerce goes hand-in-
hand with an orderly and compliant market participation framework, irrespective of how
power is dispersed:
The spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labour,
prudence, tranquility, order and rule (Montesquieu, 1989).
So as to justify and then conceal the differential wealth beneﬁts of exchange economies,
there needs to be a language of market arrangements which offers the hope of equality and
fairness, while masking the gulf between the social and the ﬁctitious. Fit for the purpose,
enter the rule of law discourse.
In the neo-liberal democratic spirit of global economic development, to maximize the
beneﬁts of capitalist economic models for those who dominate market power, the powerless
need to be convinced that certainty and predictability obtained through externally
transplanted legality is in their limited best interests. However, despite the evidence of a
positive correlation between formal legality and economic development (Dam, 2007; Trubek,
2006), the rewards of such are anything but uniform, universal or shared (Blomström and
Kokko, 1997; Basu and Guariglia, 2007). This lumpy distribution from the perspective of
market advantage as a general good, can in part be explained as markets move from the
actual to the ﬁctional (discussed below), and therefore, for the purposes of understanding the
inﬂuence of the rule of law discourse in maintaining favourable exchange market conditions,
it is necessary to chart the dynamics of this suspension from the social (in terms of
imagination and of disbelief), then speculate on its resilience.
The paper takes Polanyi’s theorising on the dis-embedding into ﬁctitious commodity
markets as a springboard for seeing how in a free trade context, vulnerable South World
market arrangements can be endangered by preferentially regulated foreign investment
masked through what I allege is the rule of law coding[4]. Speciﬁcally, I enrich Polanyi’s
analysis by using the concept of suspension to explain the forces at work behind market dis-
embedding, and why the social is presently unable to reassert its inﬂuence over market
arrangements and outcomes to achieve a more equitable dispersal of market power.
Through a brief interrogation of how dis-embedding occurs, I suggest why re-embedding
fails to recur against a rule of law discourse which would read as favouring social good. It is
nothing new to identify the masking potential of this discourse. What the analysis to follow
attempts in building on the rule of law’s coding function, is to expose essential forces at
work in dis-embedding (such as the collusion between FDI and political corruption) and the
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manner in which the rule of law discourse prohibits re-embedding by suspending the
legitimate visions of critical resistance.
Further, while here not empirically established, the paper suggests the potential role of
resistant communities[5] (seen in Durkheimian terms as contesting collective consciences)
for challenging both neo-colonial legal imperialism in the form of the rule of law and foreign
commercial interests that demand the preferential conditions which the rule of law is
anticipated to ensure[6]. Resistance declares that the state as a welfarist social
countermovement has failed, contradicting Polanyi’s belief that it would not defer from its
self-serving role as a primary market driver for re-embedding (Farrell, 2015).
Adding to the double-movement understanding
When it comes to market dis-embedding from the social, trade itself is not the problem. Rosa
Luxemberg observed regarding the shift of trade in commodities from the barter of
subsistence, that:
All exchange is mediated by money, and the value of every commodity in its exchange has its
monetary expression. What then does this monetary expression mean, and what is the basis of the
value that each commodity has in trade? [. . .] Money is simply the mediator here, and simply
expresses in the price the corresponding amount of labour contained in each commodity [. . .] (in
terms of the capitalist economic order) everything is a commodity and produced only for trade.
At the same moment, she recognised somewhat tongue in cheek, the “half-truth” of the
commodity value assumptions which underpin capitalist trade models:
How is capitalism possible in a commodity economy, given that commodities are exchanged
according to their value?
Polanyi set out as his answer that the essential commodities in capitalist exchange, land,
labour and money have become ﬁctitious through the process of market dis-embedding and,
as such, are incapable of investing true value into these essential market features. The
reason behind this inability is that the valuing of ﬁctitious commodities has nothing to do
with value determined against the assumed internal market conditions of capitalism such as
freedom to participate and the naturally selective fairness of competition. To divorce the
exchange valuing of these commodities from their prevailing historical and political
positioning is to totally misconstrue the fabricated nature of commodity proﬁt in
contemporary market exchange trading where price rests on often artiﬁcially maintained
scarcity.
Social dis-embeddedness is a central analytical concept in how Polanyi analysed the
destructive potentials of self-regulating market economies wherein market power is the
arbiter of discourse pronouncing market equality in the face of market inequality (Block and
Somers, 2014). Put simply, he suggested that as markets dis-embed from their essential
social locations, they produce more and more ﬁctitious commodities for exchange which in
turn undermine the social good of the market. If this is so and it is to perpetuate, a majority
of the disempowered stakeholders need to suspend their disbelief in market access and
fairness. Aligned with this, the social imagining that there could not be anything but an
unfair market frame offering limited opportunity to minimise the negative social
consequences of dis-embedding must also prevail.
In its present neo-liberal market form, the rule of law discourse enunciates this
mystiﬁcation phenomenon wherein ﬁctitious commodities parade like the emperor in new
clothes – naked in the vision of a social imagination not suspended through law’s
exclusionist protection of dis-embedded market exchange. In the old space, the emperor is
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clothed in the riches of free trade. In the new space, he is naked against the realities of
indigenous market divestment.
The importation and imposition of law (of the North) as a hand-maiden of exchange
market promotion, thereby divorced from the social, speciﬁcally requires a suspension of
social imagination regarding the essential role of the indigenous communal ordering forces
that even in neo-colonial contexts may be more locally inﬂuential than formalist governance
institutions of the recipient state (Hammoudi, 2013). Removed from the domestic, and at the
macro level, importing neo-liberal capitalism into previously subsistence markets requires a
suspension of disbelief in the inherent inequities of exchange markets. Local market players
are massively disempowered by the drip-feed of foreign capital with conditions to satisfy
expatriated and externalised market interests (Ruddle, 1993). Under such arrangements, and
so as to keep markets orderly, there needs to be a “talk” which holds out the promise of
better things to come for all market players. The externally determined discourse pays little
regard to the localised languages of dissent which ebb and ﬂow as the discriminatory
consequences of free trade becomemore apparent.
One such form of discourse, I argue, is the rule of law. As a language to promote
market order and certainty, the rule of law discourse has become as much of a tradable
market component as the necessities of market legality, such as contract and insurance.
Why so? Because what are often palpably unconscionable contract arrangements in
trade dealings need masking with the talk of liberty and equality. For instance, to
sustain the fundamental fallacy of the natural market balance between the value of
labour and its commodity pricing, central to the conventional morality of capitalism
espousing market freedom and unfettered competition, it has become necessary to rely
on masking discourses that have equality central to their legitimacy, and can mediate
or justify disconnects between labour productivity and labour pricing.
Dis-embedding theorising is limited in explaining how counter movements of dissent are
ﬁlling the void in the often vainglorious attempts to return markets to social good[7]. Why is
resistance necessary if the rule of law protections are accessible? Why do resistance
movements reject the institutions and processes of legality in many cases as a preferred
regulatory course to re-assert fair market access? The answers lie in part in the disconnect
between access to justice through legal institutions and processes, and the rule of law
discourse which promises such avenues of power rebalancing and dispute resolution.
Suspension, therefore, in some sense, suggests little more than how dis-embedding works
andwhy re-embedding is no longer a predictable double movement (De Sousa Santos, 2006).
The problem of market dis-embedding in not just about the proﬁt motivation behind
exchange economies trumping the necessity for social good as represented in the rule of law.
Granovetter (1985) (Giddens, 1972) emphasises the inextricable relationship between
institutional behaviour and the forces of social bonding that can be employed to explain
distorted commodity valuing. In this respect, limited access to commodiﬁed legal
institutions and processes will contain the law’s potential to ensure market fairness in
preference for a function that protects the exclusive rights claims of property ownership and
transaction. Therefore, perhaps, a fruitful place to search for why markets dis-embed at the
same time we are being told that they are made equitable through the rule of law is to think
more deeply about the foundations of social bonding as inﬂuenced by institutional
behaviour such as commodiﬁed legal practice. If social bonds are organically maintained
(such as by law which is open to the widest communal access) then, for Granovetter, the
valuing of legal institutions and their behaviour will depend on the manner in which they
complement and reﬂect the principles of social bonding rather than on who can afford to buy
them.
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The rule of law discourse[8] echoes many of these principles, so how can it be seen as a
force for dis-embedding? I suggest it is so because of the way the rule of law market
conditions are mechanically imposed, rather than organically grown as sustainable features
of domestic market arrangements and indigenous governance legalities. The rule of law
discourse was the cloak of colonial legal ordering. This is not to say that normative
commitments to equality and fairness residing in the rule of law due process requirements
are devoid of indigenous legal forms. Rather, where these are prominent, they require regular
legitimation through domestic legal application or they will be exposed as inadequate or
corrupt market facilitators. In addition, it could be said that as a device for colonial social
ordering and the legitimation of transplanted legality, the rule of law discourse was and is
incompatible with the vibrancy of localised social bonding, tending to impose a mechanical
framework of certainty in place of organically evolving social derivations.
While the social/actual selectively suspends because of the inﬂuence of mechanical
bonding such as transplanted legality, its role as an anchor against dis-embedding is in
market reality conditional, unpredictable and dispersed because its domestic frailty is
masked by a language of equality and fairness that market dynamics daily deny, while
external commercial pre-conditions blindly assume. This is a process fraught with paradox.
For instance, the rule of law discourse is contrary to the corrupt exercise of public trust
which is a feature of so many FDI relationships and inducements (Abotsi, 2016; Egger and
Winner, 2005), concealed within institutions and processes of legality that are said to reﬂect
the rule of law but rather facilitate corrupt market advantage (Pierre, 2015).
Granovetter posits that socio-economic development and modernisation brought about a
change in the kind, not degree, of embeddedness, which was in any case underway as a
consequence of domestic and international commodity economies (Granovetter, 1985). In
relation to the free-trade global economic model, there can be little doubt that fragile South
World markets are forcibly transforming the nature of dis-embedding as the availability of
investment is made dependent on externally required market conditions of certainty and
predictability deﬁned for the beneﬁt of absentee shareholders (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007;
Bissoon, 2011). The rule of law discourse offers this for the absentee market beneﬁciaries
and not as a ﬁllip to domestic market sustainability.
Gemici (2008) also approaches embeddedness as an analytical construct to discern the
changing place of economy in society throughout human history. In so doing, he uses
embeddedness to specify the degree to which economy is separated from the rest of the
society. In such a way, the embeddedness concept is a mirror for understanding how
economy becomes dislocated from its organic social bonds. When turning to the rule of law
discourse as a process of mechanical social bonding, it replaces frayed domestic
disappointments with legal protections and suggests the reality of higher-order rights
protections which are present, but for most, out of reach.
As Ebner (2010) identiﬁes, Polanyi advanced a twofold consideration of embeddedness:
as a representation of the connection of markets to the moral fabric of society, and as a
political term that refers to social reform and the regulation of markets (in particular
regarding ﬁctitious commodities) (Ebner, 2010). It is the later consideration which interests
me as to the positioning of the rule of law discourse in determining the nature of social
reform and market regulation. Both reform and regulation in the rule of law terms are
charged with serving the commercial viability of foreign investment, and to a much lesser
commercial priority for essentials of domestic market sustainability but rather for the
advancement of global trade agendas. At this point, it is useful to pause and consider the
normative importance of equality in the rule of law discourse as a measure of how domestic
market realities are out of sync with external commercial determinants.
IJDI
16,3
234
Equality – the rule of law chimera
Julius Stone asserted that justice at the very least needs to be seen in terms of a settlement
between equality and other values (Stone, 1968). As a sustainable societal ideal, justice
cannot mean perpetual and prevailing inequality. Equality is socially contingent as are
notions and manifestations of justice, whether these are focused on social and political
equality depending on economic equality (Rousseau, 1966).
Margaret Thornton, in the contemporary global context of free trade, where the market is
the measure of all things, suggests that:
[. . .] inequality is displacing equality as the pre-eminent social norm. It is economic inequality
that is corroding notions of social and political equality [. . .] Within this new marketised universe
injustice and inequality are embedded within the fabric of society. Equality has become devalued
as a social good, resulting in its decoupling from justice (Thornton, 2010).
Thornton explains the reconstitution of inequality within neo-liberalism as the prevailing
global hegemon, being discourses of choice, entrepreneurism, merit, individual success and
institutionalized competition. Even a generalised interrogation of transitional cultures and
fragmented domestic economies within the current globalisation era reveals the
incompatibility of choice and equality, choice being constrained and equality being
mediated around the power imbalances inherent in exchange economies (Findlay, 1999). The
insidious shift through globalisation is not so much as Thornton would have it, from
equality to inequality. Polanyi established convincingly that this was the economic
consequence of the great transformation, a century before where equality never existed in
the ﬁrst place in capitalist economic frames (Polanyi, 1944). Rather contemporary
globalisation has stigmatised equality in the same contrary way and for the same purpose
that it has equated markets with freedom (Findlay, 2015). Equality cannot stand against
market meritocracy which must produce winners and losers. Consequently, a convincing
structural critique of the present and fast-failing global economic order has been blind-sided,
and social sustainability is viewed only as a slave to economic growth and individual wealth
creation, inequitable as these processes and outcomes must be (Alexander, 2010).
The rule of law cannot cure the inequitable predilections of the market, only conceal
them. This is because in the free trade model, the rule of law discourse is directed towards
advancing commodiﬁcation, not ensuring the social.
Against this indictment of inequitable development models, we return to the theme of
suspension as a method of understanding how in the face of such apparent market
inequality, the morality of capitalist global free trade as a general good, is so resiliently
sustained.
Suspension – belief/imagination or compatibility
For my purposes, dis-embedding only tells part of the analytical story: in considering the
impact of free trade on fragile domestic economies, it is necessary to interrogate how dis-
embeddedness from the social (Cotterell, 2007) is sustained. In the face tenacious suspension
away from the social, the tenuous understanding of dis-embedding being a continuum to re-
embedding needs deeper substantiation (Adaman et al., 2003). To achieve this, it might be
more useful to view dis-embedding not so much a move away from or toward the social but
into and away from the ﬁctitious. Beyond Polanyi, I assert that a central consideration of
ﬁctitious markets is not just what they transact, ﬁctitious commodities (land, labour and
money) (Jessop, 2007), but how in so doing the market is suspended away from the social (or
the actual) which commodiﬁcation ensures.
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In this realm of suspension, chaos rather than certainty is evident, where the expected
deontology of the market breaks down because of the loss of any genuine social connection,
and myths or codes are substituted as the language of transaction and commodiﬁcation. Law
too becomes part of the suspension, as it is enmeshed in commodiﬁcation and the protection
of property valuing through exclusion of access, and resultant scarcity (Singer, 2000).
Another feature of dis-embedding through ﬁctitious commodiﬁcation is the contradictions
which ensue. For instance, the dis-embedding potential of post-colonial legality (embodied in
trademark and patent criminalisation in markets desperately deprived of cutting-edge
knowledge) paradoxically is protected by law at the same time that development policy,
through the push in free trade dogma opens up North World access to South World
resources, labour and markets. Affordable access to knowledge and information in South
World markets, to advance their social beneﬁt, is at the same time denied in favour of
external share-holder beneﬁt and to the detriment of making domestic markers more socially
embedded and resilient. Suspension and contradiction and dis-embedding and paradox all
challenge the establishedmorality of capitalist free trade dogma.
It is not sufﬁcient, in appreciating these disconnects, to simply refer to the slippage
between ideal and practice. This transition is a much more institutionalized and recurrent
commodity economy phenomenon than to be glossed over without deeper enquiry if
market mystiﬁcation is to be confronted. A step in the right direction is to focus on a
speciﬁc market mythology which demands justiﬁcation above coding. To reveal this
fabrication in market language, one of the essential myths said to explain the excesses of
capitalist trade models, is competition. In ﬁctitious markets, central pressure valves such
as competitive natural market selection, that might ensure the market’s connection to the
social, are suspended (through devices and languages such as intellectual property
rights). In sidestepping the challenges to free market modelling where competition is
marginalised and merit is thereby dispatched to the normative realm, the rule of law
becomes a normative tale of myths in which the social (the actual) is represented in
ﬁctitious terms.
Where is the social in all of this? For my purposes, and consistent with Polanyi, the actual
is the social and the social is embedded, where real market arrangements are working for the
social good. We are not entering utopia – the intellectual commons revolution conﬁrms the
potency of socially re-located markets against the neo-liberal norm. However, through
protracted periods of suspension, central features of the social (such as subsistence markets
and communally accountable laws) have been stripped away andmythologised so that there
is now a genuine risk of the anti-social (well evidenced in ﬁctitious markets such as the
global derivative trading and copyright enforcement) becoming the myth substitute for the
social. Herein, law and legal compliance pose as the legitimator rather than the moderator of
even where masses of property users reject interpretations of policy exclusion. Polanyi made
this point when he declared that money was not the natural product of labour but the
product of banking. Trapped in the suspended social imagination of ﬁctitious markets, the
social is unable to re-assert itself, as it has eventually become dragged into the ﬁctitious and
suspended. Localised resistance movements grow up against the excesses of globalised
trade evidence grass-roots disillusionment with the impotence of the social to re-assert
through conventional means of market governance such as the rule of law discourse.
Market-enhancing discourse is then essential for making more generally palatable the
impoverishing social consequences of dis-embedded markets. As recent post-capitalist
discourse echoes (Mason, 2015; Flder and Vighi, 2014), over time, market myths lose their
meaning and power. Market decay becomes the real, as the natural by-product of suspension
from the actual. With markets no longer exchanging the sustainable real, they expose
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themselves to decay from within. The myth of market freedom and its surprising endurance
is not sustainable because the community it serves is ever contracting and without social
remedy. The conditions of the healthy market are lost, as markets are driven to individualist
proﬁts represented in dangerously expanding wealth gaps.
Market conditions for global trade and legal orientalism
In his discussion of the rule of law, Baron Bingham identiﬁes a central principle in the rule of
law thinking that “the law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and
predictable” (Bingham, 2010). In this aphorism lies one of the problematic realities of neo-
colonial legality[9]; the rule of law economic order is essential for North/South World
commercial interaction, irrespective of whether such legality fairly and equitably enables
foreign and domestic markets to beneﬁt from consequent market conditions.
The irredentist nature of market conditions evidenced through compliance with the rule
of law when it comes to the facilitation of global trade is anything but concealed. Lord
Mansﬁeld made it stark:
The daily negotiations and property of merchants ought not to depend on subtleties and niceties;
but on rules easily learned and easily retained because they are dictates of common sense, drawn
from the truth of the case (Vallejo v.Wheeler [1774]).
No confusion here as to the nature or the location of the common sense to which he referred
and it was not indigenous or instinctive but case-bound. Mansﬁeld continued:
In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore it is of more
consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether a rule is established one way or another.
Because speculators then know what grounds to go upon (Vallejo v.Wheeler [1774]).
It could not be clearer. The rule of law market conditions are for the comfort of the
speculator in mercantile dealings. In this tradition, it is North World legalism and North
World trade advantage which assumes the rule of lawmarket conditions:
[. . .] the dominance of Western legalism is largely taken as a given. As a result, analysts of
domestic and international law tend to look primarily at the privileged domains of legal
interaction amongst lawyers, judges business people and entrepreneurs, and to ignore the
perspectives of ordinary people whose culturally informed normative understandings of law may
be very diﬀerent (Rajagopal, 2003).
Like it or not, for the South World rule of law is a post-colonial transplant, for good or ill.
The relationships between legal orientalism (Said, 1978), capitalism and global political
economy oblige the rule of law expansionism to push aside aspirations for a more
cosmopolitan legality (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). Rather than
empowering, the rights-less legal orientalism (masked as the rule of law) conﬁrms the
marginality of the South World and the centrality of the hegemonic North. In this
exclusionist climate for law, national elites within post-colonial states ﬂourish in hegemonic
miniatures favouring the North, and reap the beneﬁts of socio-economic development
models which advance capitalist advantage to the oppression of their own peoples. As such
the dis-embeddedmarket denies the rule of law imperatives.
Globalising the rule of law – cracking hegemonic codes
The beauty of the rule of law is that it’s neutral. No one – the human rights community, the
business community, the Chinese leadership-objects to it[10].
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The synergy between the rule of law and global development emphasises the competence of
legal institutions measured against a liberal democratic governance ideal. Not so if that
measure is the achievement of equitable market share at a domestic level. In such evaluations,
there is little associated emphasis on equitable requirements in substantive law. Central to the
rule of law in its expansive interpretations is the inextricability of human rights principles such
as equality of treatment under the law. These pre-conditions in commercial trade practice
remain subservient to efﬁcient system indicators such as independent judiciaries, predictable
outcomes andwell-regulated private lawmarket facilitation.
To obtain the beneﬁts of funded development and therefrom to gain participation in the
global economy, international ﬁnancial organisations require of South World societies a
demonstrated commitment and adherence to Western legality (Ewick and Silbey, 1998).
Consequently, Anglo-American and European legal traditions help to institutionalise
prevailing power asymmetries that characterised the colonial separations of North/South
Worlds, and on which exclusionist private property arrangements advanced through
capitalism[11]. Legal practices, meanings and imaginations become grounded in external
hegemony, torn free from contesting indigenous understandings.
It might be said that the international popularity of the rule of law “legalism” rests on its
perceived procedural focus rather than more contested human rights discourse (Rajagopal,
2008). This is particularly so when the facilitative nexus between the rule of law legalism
and global development agendas is interrogated:
The rule of law has become invaluable to international ﬁnancial institutions as the bedrock of
predictable and productive free market activity after conﬂict. The World Bank presents it as a vehicle
for enforceable private rights in contract and property, which fosters entrepreneurship and investment
(Dam, 2006; Carothers, 2006). Just as in the human rights ﬁeld, the understanding of the rule of law
reduces the possibility that development could have more radical dimensions[12].
Despite its hegemonic attractions, exporting the rule of law has had limited impact on
ensuring accountable and participatory governance (Chandler, 2006). Maybe this is because
the rule of law is marketed alongside a model of governance in which the state is the centre
of functional power, and society is pluralist and engaged. None of these assumptions hold in
disaggregated South World state settings. In societies that are alternatively structured
through layers of obligation and dependency, centralised state institutional justice will
retain far less signiﬁcance than the discipline frameworks of non-state groupings[13].
The limited commercial focus of the rule of law projects in economic development
demonstrates a reluctance by external actors to recognise the complexity of local politics and
culture, and to meaningfully engage with their particularities to ensure that the rule of law
frame can be adapted and take root. For instance, a denial of the existence or value of local legal
traditions makes such a disconnect more justiﬁable from the perspective of rule of law
advocates. A consequence of this disengagement is the preferencing for a “thin” or minimalist
version of the rule of law requiring little more than laws for market ordering, and government
adherence to rules that legitimate political authority. In this incarnation, the rule of law is
unable to endorse and protect economic, social and cultural rights at a local level. Because the
rule of law now seems apparent through little more than legality and legal institutions, it has
lost what Krygier calls its “telos”, the restraint on abuse of power. For this purpose, legal
institution-buildingmay not be enough. In curbing abuses of power legal institutions:
[. . .] always need supporting circumstances, social and political structures and cultural supports
which are not always available, and diﬃcult to engineer (Krygier, 2008).
Missing in this observation are the reasons why cultural supports are absent or withheld,
and why attempts at their engineering are often a deluded postcolonial adventure. Rather
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than returning to a rule of law vocabulary better in touch with a rich account of human
rights[14], there is a greater likelihood to encourage legality as the servant of cultural
empowerment through political and economic equality by criticisingWestern legal diffusion
as an agent of hegemonic globalisation, thereby enabling a more meaningful transposition
of legal regulation to protect rather than imperiling SouthWorld emancipation.
Free trade – the suspension of the actual
Free trade is advanced as enabling every nation state, North and South, to beneﬁt from the
present socioeconomic miracle. What the open trade sub-text does not reveal is that free means
free only if the stakeholder claiming the proﬁt possesses signiﬁcant market empowerment to
exercise the opportunities that under-regulation affords the few. This is the ﬁrst level of
suspension in space – suspension away from domestic market protection. As I suggested
earlier, suspension is a dynamic for understanding market transition from the social to the
ﬁctitious. In simple subsistence markets, there was little need for protection because market
output was consumed and bartered, not commodiﬁed and traded. The further markets
suspended from fundamental social utility and became frameworks for exchange economies,
the more likely they suspended from considerations of general good and remained aloft in the
rareﬁed stratosphere of individual wealth creation. Law developed as the language for
explaining the exclusionist property rights on which individual wealth became transacted
(Smith, 2012). At the same time, the ideology of the rule of law talked to the disempowered and
those unable to traverse the ﬁctitious, promising that the results of suspending economy from
the social would eventually revert to the fair and equitable enjoyment of the many, through
legalist accountability. The disempowered mass, until resistance became the only reality,
suspended their belief in the impending beneﬁts from inequities of market distribution, and
suspended their disbelief in the emerging elitist ‘anti-social’.
Closely aligned with this initial suspension through exchange market economies is the idea
that more external foreign investment will beneﬁt otherwise disempowered domestic markets.
The conditions for such investmentﬂowwere the restructuringof domestic governance certainties
around the rule of law discourse. However, as I have already argued, laudable asmany rule of law
aspirations might be and compatible with market re-embedding, in the FDI context, these were
codes for the primary advancement of absentee shareholder proﬁt. Themarkets so ordered further
suspended above the rule of law ideology, when domestic political and legal capacities were
incapable of demanding that the discourse translate intodomestic social enrichment.
Translating FDI into commercial advantage where domestic stakeholders might otherwise
seek returns to the social, the selective ﬂow of facilitation payments through politically and
culturally maintained structures of obligation and dependency skyrocket suspension from even
the dream of naturally selected competitive market arrangements. Corruption of more organic
market preferencing suspends capital ﬂow, investment direction and proﬁt allocation away
from considerations of the social, and in turn inverts the communal good of the social into some
neo-liberal ‘dog eat dog’ market resource and revenue bargain. The market thereby becomes
suspended from the rule of law restraint when nice distinctions are drawn between good and
bad corruption, and smart and suspect facilitation (Jalil et al., 2016; Meon andKhalid 2005).
As a consequence, we are left with ﬁctitious markets which have dis-embedded from the
social, capturing the rule of law discourse, dulling its capacity to code and mythologise and
destabilising the market deontology which it is supposed to provide. The social is dragged into
some suspended formwherein its duties and obligations are forfeit to invertedmarket objectives.
The problem that lies with dis-embedded markets would resolve itself should, as Polanyi
suggests, the double movement come full circle in the form of re-embedding ﬁctitious markets
into the social. Yet, the weakness of this second and arguably more crucial movement, also the
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reason for its failed realisation, is its reliance in part on actors and tools that lack the impetus to
reinstate the market in the hands of those who ought to beneﬁt from it. In particular, the state
through corruption or complicity in FDI is behind the dis-embedding process, making anti-
social market, interventionist regulations all the more unlikely.
In this state of near irretrievable suspension, neither the rule of un-law discourse nor
fundamental structures of anti-social obligation can overcome their compromise and as such
are unable to react and return to embedding social conditions. The initiation of the second re-
embedding movement and the awakening of suspended beliefs are left to localist resistance
movements rising as forces to hold externalised self-regulation to account.
Michael Polanyi had this to say in attacking the need to suspend disbelief to reconcile the
ﬁctitious:
In witnessing murder on the stage we are aware of the setting and the antecedents of the stage
murder, which are incompatible with the murder being genuine; yet – just as in the case of the
metaphor – we do not reject the contradictory aﬃrmations, which would make the stage murder a
nonsensical deception, but call upon our imaginative powers to integrate incompatible matters
into a joint meaning. The joint meaning has, in a play, the peculiar quality of a dramatic event
visible only to the imagination, just as the meaning of a metaphor, produced by integration of its
two incompatible constituents, is known to us only in our imagination (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975).
He provides the answer to those who say, how can we dismiss the rule of law discourse as
simply code and myth? The discourse itself is nothing of the sort. In fact, aggressively applied
to domestic legal capacity and against foreign market incursion, it may well shore up the
failings of indigenous legality. Law is not all bad, imperial or otherwise, provided it has the
ability and commitment to enforce its normative frame irrespective of market power.
Where do things go wrong for South World markets bathed in the rule of law discourse and
even so failing to beneﬁt from its protection? We return to suspension. Michael Polanyi suggests
that the metaphoric and the actual are made compatible through imagination. Maybe so.
However, imagination depends on degrees of choice and empowerment. Prior to anymajor power
dispersal in markets that are dis-embedded, which may come as a consequence of communal
dissent, the process of suspension is powerfully infused with the rule of law discourse which
softens the consequences of the ﬁctitious market much in the same way that Karl Polanyi
envisaged as the state involvement in the welfare return of the doublemovement (Polanyi, 1944).
Where is the answer to this market schizophrenia outside suspension and eventual decay?
Polanyi was saying that when we are faced with the actual (markets moving from the social)
and the incompatible (markets remaining dis-embedded) without force to return to the social –
suspended from and suspended beyond – we do not have to suspend disbelief or imagination
but rather rely on restored imagination to bring the two together. In this sense, the rule of law
principles devoid of masking rhetoric transform into an embedding agent, provided the right
reformed market conditions are in place. The rule of law if it is no longer a harlot to the market
but a piercing priest requiring ascription to its ideals, achieves a transition from a force to dis-
embed, towards embedding. The normative foundations of the rule of law are right for this.
The connection between suspension and embeddedness is established. There is the
ﬁctitious (which is suspended) and actual (which is embedded), and the movement
between the two can be understood not so much by suspending disbelief but by using
the imagination of achieving the rule of law principled frames (and not coding
discourse) to make the real and the ﬁctitious compatible. There are spaces between the
real and the ﬁctional which are claimed by those who resist dis-embedding and who
struggle for access to the beneﬁts of trade which they are currently denied. In this, it is a
struggle to realise the rule of law normative frames.
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Conclusion – law’s restitutive project
The rule of law discourse cannot be easily discarded as it is now everyone’s stated tradition of
preferred governance. Instead, it must be infusedwithmeaning beyond empty rhetoric to provide
substantive law with an empowering normative framework to act as a market re-embedding
force and thereby maintain its relevance. Law must assist in the cultivation of a market
consciousness that can open up conditions for addressing fundamental market inequities, rather
than papering over their reality. Law can provide the necessary circuits of institutionality which
through better pathways of communicating dissent, will see subaltern groups ﬁnd market
emancipation (Spivak, 1999) and thereby the restoration ofmarket valuing to the social.
There will be those who retain their doubts about power dispersal, particularly if it is seen
as an equality project. We accept that in contemporary market exchange economies, power
equality is utopian. Recognising that power produces and perpetuates asymmetries, equality is
a failed ideal. Consistent with the distractions offered up through the rule of law discourse or
other normative frames designed to suspend social imagination away from the disempowering
dimensions of ﬁctitious commodity exchange, casting power equality as some form of
attainable right ignores the practicalities of grassroots resistance.
Accepting power asymmetries, the aspiration for power differentials through market re-
embedding is to better open up conditions for the negotiation and renegotiation of market
advantage. Law beyond discourse, if it is transformed away from its neo-liberal market
alliances, has the potential to umpire more organic market bargaining, premised on realistic
power dispersal within the softened asymmetries within mechanical divisions of labour. Legal
agency can hasten this process by assisting in the revaluing of property as a more communally
embedded resource and opening up access to market beneﬁts which till now remain the
province of the powerful.
Notes
1. For a deeper discussion of this relationship, see (Findlay, 2017).
2. Solomon (2011) De Mello (1999) Borensztein et al. (1998). Recently, populist politics has cast
doubt on the universal beneﬁts of free trade, but not based on concerns for South world
exploitation.
3. The limits of a journal article prevent the full development of this argument, but for those who
are interested in its enunciation, see Findlay (2017) Chapters 6 and 7.
4. In this sense, I am using the notion of coding as a process whereby normative endorsement
endeavours to legitimate contrary market practice, in a way which suspends both that practice and
the natural criticism it would otherwise shoulder. It is an external market inﬂuence tending to
legitimate internal market asymmetries.
5. The author eschews a reductionist cosmopolitan explanation of resistance against globalisation,
representing the model of resistance which I see as implying some political concurrence where in fact
resistance is as local and simple and powerful as the market ruptures it confronts.
6. A richer discussion of the utility of resistance and dissent can be read in Findlay (2017).
7. Radical cosmopolitan and anti-globalisation literature, in contrast, is fascinated with just this
phenomenon, but often emerging in an unduly politicised and idealised refrain.
8. In this analysis, I am not impugning certain inclusive and equitable interpretations of the rule of law
in a compatible normative sense. Rather, I am using susbstantivist interpretations of the rule of law
as a discourse for types of governance and as the focus of critique.
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9. As will be developed later, our understanding of this concept is restricted to the manner in which
North World legal processes and institutions remain in the fabric of post-colonial market as a
condition of foreign investment and trade.
10. Quoted in Trebilcock and Daniels (2008)
11. Findlay (2015).
12. Charlesworth (2010). See also Waldron (2008).
13. Findlay (1999). See also Trubeck and Galanter (1974).
14. Advocated by Charlesworth (2010, p. 60).
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